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Is If-then-ism Still an Option?
Abstract
In this paper I am going to try to prove that if-then-ism is not an option. I will focus on if-
then-ism as a strategy to reduce ontological commitments in mathematics. I will start with the
definition of if-then-ism in The Principles of Mathematics. Then I am going to discuss the
Putnam’s criticism of if-then-ism. Next I will move on to some arguments of Cian Dorr that
support it. In the end, I will talk about ontological parsimony as the general motivation for
adopting the if-then-ism. I will discuss ontological parsimony in connection with naturalism
and argue that demand for ontological parsimony does not follow from naturalism.
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In this essay I will concentrate on some issues concerning “if-then-ism” and
try to refute it as a plausible philosophical theory. Russell formulated if-
then-ism as a paraphrase strategy which shows that mathematics could be
derived out of logic. Russell did not deny existence of abstract objects, what
he denied was necessary existence of abstract objects.1 Mathematical claims
are necessary true, whereas according to him no existential claims are nece-
sarily true. So statements of pure mathematics are not existential:
“All propositions as to what actually exists, like the space we live in, belong to experimental or
empirical science, not to mathematics.” (Russell, B., 1992, p. 5)
Russell’s reasons for if-then-ism are certainly not connected with ontologi-
cal parsimony, because in this period his ontology was very rich:
“Whatever may be an object of thought, or may occur in any true or false proposition, or can
be counted as one, I call a term. This, then, is the widest word in the philosophical vocabulary.
I shall use as synonymous with it the words unit, individual, and entity. The first two emphasize
the fact that every term is one, while the third is derived from the fact that every term has be-
ing, i.e. is in some sense.” (Russell, B., 1992, p. 43)
Later there were some proposals to use if-then-ism in order to avoid onto-
logical commitments to abstract mathematical objects (numbers).
Russell starts with the following definition of “if-then-ism” in The Principles
of Mathematics:
“1. PURE Mathematic is the class of all propositions of the form ‘p implies q’, where p and q
are propositions containing one or more variables, the same in two propositions, and neither p
nor q contains any constants except logical constants.” (Russell, B., 1992, p. 3)
1
See: Colin Cheyne, “Existence Claims and
Casuality”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy,
Vol. 76, No. 1, March 1998, pp. 37–38
If-then-ism nicely fits into the general project of logicism. If if-then-ists are
able to translate the whole mathematics into statements which have the
form of implications, then the project has achieved its goal.
This connection explains why pure mathematics should not ontologically
commit one to anything. It is not the task of logic to make any existence
claims. Logic just helps one to infer from one sentence to another, and
mathematics viewed as a branch of logic has the same role. Mathematical
statements are true, but mathematics remains ontologically neutral. It does
not commit us to mathematical objects nor denies their existence. Since the
logicists’ project failed, if-then-ism is no longer a method with which one
can support this project and I will not discuss if-then-ism in that connec-
tion.2
In this paper I will focus on if-then-ism as a strategy to reduce ontological
commitments in mathematics. First I am going to discuss some arguments
of Cian Dorr that support if-then-ism, then I will move on to the Putnam’s
criticism of if-then-ism. In the end, I am going to talk about ontological par-
simony as the general motivation for adopting the if-then-ism.
Let me now present an argument of Cian Dorr in favour of if-then-ism.
Dorr is ready to accept abstract objects only in case if they are indispensa-
ble for good explanations. But he believes that benefits one gains by believ-
ing in the existence of abstract objects are illusory. He thinks sciences are
paradigmatic case of how one should gain knowledge. In other words, he is
an adherent of naturalism. When a philosopher has to decide between real-
ism and anti-realism concerning abstract objects she just has to compare
which theory is better in accounting for and systematising the given (scien-
tific) data, in the same way, as one compares different scientific theories.
Dorr then takes three theories T, T´ and T†. T is an ordinary scientific the-
ory, T´ is an if-then-istic theory which avoids ontological commitment to
abstract objects, defined by following principle:
“If it were the case that [mathematical axioms] and the concrete world were just as it actually
is, it would be the case that T.” (Dorr, C., 2005, p. 9)
So what Dorr suggests is if-then-istic interpretation of mathematical state-
ments. The other feature of his analysis is fictionalism. His if-then-ism is
different from Russellian. Russell thinks that mathematics is a class of true
propositions that are deduced from logic, whereas Dorr denies that mathe-
matical statemens are true. That explains why he uses counterfactuals in the
above citation. Platonistic reading of mathematical statements is not true in
the actual world, but merely on some other possible world.
Let me return to the above mentioned three theories. T† is also a if-then-
istic theory. T† avoids ontological commitment to sub-atomic particles:
T† “As far as atoms and larger entities are concerned, it is just as if T.” (Dorr, C., 2005, p. 10)
Let me first take a look at T and T´. T´ has, according to Dorr, exactly the
same consequences for the concrete world as T itself. The realist has to give
an argument that T´ provides a worse explanation than T.
Dorr next considers T†. T† is not a good theory. Science gives us good rea-
sons to believe that there are subatomic particles whereas T† denies this
fact. A theory like T† demands, if it is true, further explanation. Any further
explanation of T† would have to appeal to the existence of subatomic parti-
cles.
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T´ and T† are similar theories because they are formed in a similar way.
Both of them are derived from other, stronger theory, T by the application
of a complex operator. So one might think that both of them are bad. But
unlike T†, T´ does not demand further explanation. There are alternatives
to standard platonistic scientific theories, which do not entail existence of
abstract mathematical objects, like numbers. The most famous example is
Fieldian physics (see Field, H., 1980) But Fieldian and other attempts are
not carried out completeley. They have not formulated all the science in
nominalistic terms. Besides, there are several critiques to such strategies. So
their success is not yet beyond doubt.
Dorr points out the relevant difference between T´ and T† in operators
which were applied to the original theory T. The operator in case of T† is a
kind of possibility-operator. So T† says that there is some world where T is
true, while the facts about atoms and larger things are just as they are in the
actual world. The operator in T´ can also be expressed in terms of possible
worlds. The theory states that in every world where mathematical axioms
are true, and which is like the actual world in other respects, T is true. So it
has the form of necessity-operator.
In case of T† we use the possibility operator which could be expressed as ex-
istential quantification over posible worlds, whereas in case of T´ one uses
universal quantification over possible worlds.
“… existential quantification is a distinctive source of theoretical badness…On the other hand,
universal quantification doesn’t seem to be a source of badness in the same way. When we talk
in our physical theories about the ‘x’, ‘y’ and ‘z’ co-ordinates of particles, we certainly don’t
mean to suggest that there is a distinguished, physically real co-ordinate system, concerning
which we could sensibly ask how far we are from its origin. Rather, we are implicitly making a
universally quantified claim, to the effect that the theory in question holds true for every ac-
ceptable co-ordinate system.” (Dorr, C., 2005, p. 13)
Therefore, Dorr claims that existential quantification is the source of all
trouble, whereas universal quantification is not problematic. In other
words, he believes that existential quantification commits one ontologically
to things one does not want to commit to, and this is the source of its weak-
ness. In case of T´ one uses universal quantification over possible worlds
and no ontological commitment occurs.
His argument for mathematical if-then-ism could be reconstructed in a fol-
lowing way:
1. premise: Only universal quantification over possible worlds is involved in
mathematical if-then-ism.
2. premise: Universal quantification over abstract objects (numbers, possi-
ble worlds) does not ontologically commit one to the existence of ab-
stract objects.
3. (hidden) premise: Abstract objects (numbers, possible worlds) are not to
be accepted in ontology.
4. conclusion: Mathematical if-then-ism is an acceptable solution.
I would like to stress once again that Dorr’s kind of if-then-ism is a fiction-
alist kind of if-then-ism (Mathematical axioms are not true, but if they were
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true, then such and such statements would follow from them). Mathematics
is a fiction, and all the content which scientist needs for her work must con-
sequentially be statable without invoking mathematical entities. Dorr tries
to achieve that by avoiding existential quantification over abstract objects.
Fictionalism is subject to Putnam’s criticism. Putnam denies any possibility
of being anti-realist concerning abstract mathematical entities, and at the
same time being realist concerning physical theories. In science one cannot
avoid existential quantification over abstract objects. Not believing in exis-
tence of numbers and at the same time using mathematics for scientific pur-
poses, according to Hilary Putnam, is like
“… trying to maintain that God does not exist and angels do not exist while maintaining at the
very same time that it is an objective fact that God has put an angel in charge of each star and
the angels in charge of each of a pair of binary stars were always created at the same time!”
(Putnam, H., 1975, p. 74)
Fieldian nominalist answers to that challenge by claiming that mathematics
is conservative. This means roughly that mathematics does not add nothing
to the nominalistic content. It merely helps to deduce purely nominalistic
claims from initial claims that can also be stated purely nominalistic. In-
stead of focusing attention on this issue, I will try to spell out my objections.
My first objection to Dorr’s argument concerns his interpretation of if-
then-ism. Mathematical if-then-ism is nothing else but mere translation of
all mathematical statements in the form of formal implication. Dorr just re-
places one form of implication with the other (universal quantification over
possible worlds). This new interpretation does not make things clearer. If
someone does not find if-then-ism in standard Russellian manner to be
atractive, why would she change her belief because of this new modal inter-
pretation? Actually, this new interpretation makes things even worse be-
cause of the accepted fictionalism.
My second objection to Dorr’s argument concerns its third premise. There
are two reasons why nominalists do not accept abstract objects. First of
them is that they seem to be epistemologically inaccesible, because one can-
not have any causal connection with them. The second objection is that one
can do without abstract objects. That means that abstract objects violate the
principle of Ockham’s razor. I will try to answer to that challenge.
Traditionally, the principle of Ockham’s razor is understood as a rule that
forbids the multiplication of entities beyond actual need. Hence, one is jus-
tified to accept only those entities that are necessarily needed for the con-
struction of theories. It has been argued that this principle demands scarce
ontology. This view could be summarized with next slogan: the parsimoni-
ous the ontology the better the theory. For the most part, this has been the
standpoint supported by declared naturalists (Quine, Field, Dorr). For
naturalists, any kind of interference of ontological principles with science is
unacceptable. So it is quite natural to ask what is the role of Ockham’s ra-
zor in science. Since naturalists reject interference of ontological principles
with science, one must regard Ockham’s razor as a methodological princi-
ple. Here, I wish to mention that Mark Colyvan (see Colyvan, M., 2001, pp.
76–77) speaks of four methodological principles:
a) simplicity and economy of the theory;
b) explanatory and unificatory power of the theory;
c) boldness and fruitfulness;
d) formal elegance.
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Ockham’s razor belongs to the first group of principles. Nominalists under-
stand the Ockham’s razor principle as a principle which aims at reduction
of ontological commitments, regardless of the above-mentioned methodo-
logical principles. According to Fieldian nominalism, we should avoid num-
bers if we can, without paying any attention to the fact that, for example, if-
then-istic conception of mathematics is much more complicated than the
Platonistic one. Ockham’s razor is, in the first place, a methodological prin-
ciple aimed at successful, simple, uniform and explanatory powerful theo-
ries. Its main task is to avoid the entities that do not have any role in expla-
nation or prediction and not to minimalize the number of entities needed
by the theory. Abstract objects take important part in scientific explanation
of different natural phenomena. So Ockham’s razor does not forbid their
use.
If someone has been able to point at an attempt of avoiding certain kinds of
entities, there were usually other reasons for such avoidance as, for in-
stance, lack of explanatory power, threat of inconsistency etc. I believe that
the nominalists have been largely overstating the importance of ontological
parsimony.
If Ockham’s razor principle is read only as a demand for parsimonious on-
tology, then this principle is incoherent with naturalism, leading into the
minimalist prejudice that does not follow from the needs of science. For ex-
ample, Fieldian physics can not be regarded as advancement in develop-
ment of science. Because of its complicated and long-winded structure is
useless for practical needs of science. It also means no progress in explana-
tory and unificatory power of physics. Demand for parsimonious ontology is
incoherent with naturalism, because it means interference of ontological
principles with science.
Complicated paraphrase strategies do not contribute to the explanatory and
unificatory power of mathematics. If-then-ist´s account of mathematics is in
conflict with sincere assertions of mathematicians who claim that certain
mathematical entity exists, it is very implausible to say that a mathematician
actually does not know what he asserts (see Resnik, 1980). On the other
hand, physicist’s claims about the existence of some physical entity are not
regarded by if-then-ist in the same way. The platonistic logical analysis of
mathematics is the same as in case of referring to concrete objects. One
analyses the sentence “3 is prime” in the same way as the sentence “John is
fat”. Both of the sentences have subject-predicate form. There is no double
explanation. A theory which offers a unified explanation of several different
phenomena is to be favoured over a theory which has the same explanatory
power but offers different explanations for different phenomena.
In this paper I tried to show that if-then-ism is not an option becuse of the
following reasons:
1. A science without abstract objects (science that contains the if-then-istic
paraphrase of mathematics or Fieldian nominalized science) cannot be
regarded as advancement according to methodological principles. Com-
plicated paraphrase strategies do not contribute to the explanatory and
unificatory power of mathematics – on the contrary, they make theories
less simple and less usefull. Morever, complete science stated exclusively
in nominalistic terms is still a goal that has not been achieved yet. Ma-
thematics that contains abstract objects is still a practical necessity.
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2. Arguments of Cian Dorr contained contentious premise, namely his de-
mand for ontological parsimony. If one treats the demand for ontologi-
cal parsimony as ontological principle, then his methodes are not com-
patible with naturalism (Interference of ontological principles in scien-
ce). On the other hand, ontological parsimony understood as methodo-
logical principle does not commit one to the acceptance of anti-realism
concerning abstract objects.
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Ist der Wenn-Dann-Ismus immer noch eine Option?
Zusammenfassung
Im Folgenden werde ich über den Wenn-Dann-Ismus als Strategie zur Verringerung unserer ontolo-
gischen Verpflichtungen in der Mathematik sprechen. Ich beginne mit der Definition des Wenn-
Dann-Ismus in Principles of Matemathics. Danach setze ich mich mit Puntnams Kritik des
Wenn-Dann-Ismus auseinander. Es folgen einige Argumente von Cian Dorr, die diese Kritik unter-
stützen. Zuletzt soll von der ontologischen Sparsamkeit als allgemeinem Motiv für die Aneignung
des Wenn-Dann-Ismus die Rede sein. Ich werde von der ontologischen Sparsamkeit („parsimony”)
in Zusammenhang mit dem Naturalismus sprechen und zugunsten der These argumentieren, dass
die Bevorzugung der ontologischen Sparsamkeit nicht aus dem Naturalismus hervorgeht.
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Matija Arko
Le si-alors-sinon, est-il toujours une option?
Sommaire
Je parlerai dans cet article du si-alors-sinon comme d’une stratégie de nos obligations ontologiques
dans les mathématiques. Je commencerai par la définition du si-alors-sinon dans les Principia
mathematica. Ensuite, je discuterai la critique du si-alors-sinon par Putnam. Suivront certains ar-
guments de Ciana Dorra qui l’appuient. Finalement, il sera question de la « parcimonie » ontolo-
gique en tant que motif d’adoption du si-alors-sinon. Je traiterai de la parcimonie ontologique en
liaison avec le naturalisme en essayant de démontrer que la parcimonie ontologique n’est pas une
exigence découlant du naturalisme.
Mots clés
si-alors-sinon, parcimonie ontologique, naturalisme, philosophie des mathématiques
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